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Constitutional Protections of Property Interests
In Western Water
James L. Huffman*
Hertha L. Lund**
Christopher T. Scoones***
“What is common to many is taken least care of, for all
men have greater regard for what is their own than for
what they possess in common with others.”
– Aristotle
Western water rights are unlike any other real property interest because
they are a usufructuary right. Thus, a water right holder has a right to
use, but does not own, the corpus of the water. This makes water rights
similar in some ways to intellectual property. As a result of this unique
character, the muddle that currently exists in takings jurisprudence is
further exacerbated when applied to water right takings claims. This
muddle highlights the pressing need to safeguard excessive,
unpredictable, or unfair use of the government’s ability to take private
property in the form of water rights.
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I.

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WESTERN WATER
RIGHTS

Water scarcity in the western states led to the development of the
water law doctrine of prior appropriation. 1 The Americans moving into
these arid lands created a new system of water law to replace the English
common law doctrine of riparian rights used in the eastern states. 2 The
riparian system, which had been imported to the eastern states from
England, was not suitable to the arid West because it restricted water use
to land adjacent to streams. 3 In the West, where water was scarce and
often located some distance from where it was needed, the miners and
agricultural water users required a system that would allow water to be
diverted and used on both riparian and non-riparian lands. The prior
1.
ROBERT EMMET CLARK ET AL., 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS: A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS & ALLIED PROBLEMS: EASTERN, WESTERN,
FEDERAL § 405,40–41 (1972).
2.
Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water
Law for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV.
861, 865, 868 (2001).
3.
2 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES 1 (1974).
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appropriation doctrine followed naturally from the miners’ customs for
claiming mineral lands.4
As with mining claims, the first person to divert water and put it
to a beneficial use acquired a property right to the amount of water
diverted. This principle of priority is sometimes referred to as “first in
time, first in right,” and it determines the priority (order) in which water
rights are used. 5 A second principle of the prior appropriation doctrine is
the beneficial use rule, which requires that a water right be put to a
beneficial use. This rule of beneficial use prohibits waste and speculation
in the arid West where water is a scarce resource. In short, western
appropriation water rights differed fundamentally from eastern riparian
water rights due to contrasting geographical conditions that dictated a
different approach to allocating water among private users. Territorial and
state courts of the West legitimized this approach as the prior appropriation
doctrine while generally rejecting the riparian doctrine. 6 Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming all established legal systems based on prior
appropriation as either a complete replacement for, or in addition to, the
traditional common law riparian rights system of law. 7
Before 1890, water law in the West emphasized absolute property
rights in water.8 However, some leaders in the development of western
water law considered water a unique resource in which the public’s interest
should take precedence over private property rights. Elwood Mead, who
observed the Colorado system of appropriation of water rights in the
4.
TERRY LEE ANDERSON, BRANDON SCARBOROUGH, LAWRENCE R.
WATSON, TAPPING WATER MARKETS, 29 (2012).
5.
Carolyn F. Burr, A Survey of Water Rights Title Review in the Six
Western States, 52 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. IN. (2006); ROBERT EMMET CLARK ET AL., 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS & ALLIED
PROBLEMS: EASTERN, WESTERN, FEDERAL 61 (1967).
6.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 41. A few states, notably California,
Oregon, and Washington, adopted dual systems which recognized both riparian and
appropriation rights. The dual system continues to function, albeit poorly, in
California.
7.
Morriss, supra note 2, at 865.
8.
TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, Fishing for Property
Rights to Fish, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce
Yandle eds., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1993).
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making, was the first water engineer for the state of Wyoming. Mead was
the chief architect of the Wyoming system, which the Wyoming legislature
adopted in 1890. 9 The Wyoming system included provisions in the state
constitution and water code that provided for subordination of an
appropriator to the welfare of the state. 10
Mead built these provisions into Wyoming’s water law because
he feared that water would be monopolized without them. The Wyoming
doctrine influenced other western states,11 but most states did not adopt it
in its entirety. Rather, the states tailored their water law systems to their
particular circumstances and preferences.
Notably, many states rejected the notion of subordinating private
rights to the public welfare and instead followed Colorado in establishing
that the public owned the water subject to individual rights of
appropriation. 12 In his water law treatise, Robert Emmett Clark
summarized the western system:
[I]n western jurisdictions, the water of natural streams
[was] declared by constitution or statute to be the property
of the public and subject to appropriation. The states
[had] authority to establish for themselves rules within
their borders, subject to constitutional restraint against
interfering with vested property rights or the taking of
private property for public use without just
compensation.13
Therefore, even though Mead’s Wyoming system attempted to establish
strong public rights in water, most western states adopted systems favoring
private water rights. 14 In his 1912 treatise on irrigation and water rights,
Clesson Kinney did not summarize western water law as subordinating
private water rights to the welfare of the state. Rather, he stated:
9.
ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS
109 (1983).
10.
WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 3; Basin Elec. Coop. v. State Bd. of Control,
578 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1978).
11.
DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 113–32.
12.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
13.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at § 53, 348–349 (emphasis added).
14.
Id. at § 22; DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 86–132.

2019

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF WATER RIGHTS

31

A water right, acquired under the arid region doctrine of
appropriation, may be defined as the exclusive,
independent property right to the use of water
appropriated according to law from any natural stream,
based upon possession and the right continued only so
long as the water is actually applied to some beneficial
use or purpose.15
Even in those western states that adopted some version of Mead’s
Wyoming system, western water law established more certain private
rights in water than did the riparian doctrine:
A water right under the doctrine of prior appropriation is
an “exclusive right.” Under the common law the right to
use water from a stream is not exclusive. The commonlaw right to the use of water by one individual depends
upon the equal or correlative rights to its use by all of the
riparian owners. Riparian proprietors are tenants in
common while appropriators are tenants in severalty. 16
As a result of riparian proprietors being tenants in common, their water
rights are nonexclusive with respect to the other riparians, but exclusive
with respect to non-riparian owners and the state. Conversely, a prior
appropriation water right is exclusive against all including the state.
Therefore, the prior appropriation system established a stronger property
interest in the use of a certain quantity or flow of water than did the riparian
system.
Furthermore, riparian rights are not alienable, severable, divisible,
or assignable, apart from the land adjacent to the stream. 17 Conversely,
the western prior appropriation system for the most part recognizes that a
water right is severable, alienable, and assignable apart from land, so long

15.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 347 (citing 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION
&WATER RIGHTS, 1314–1315 (2d ed. 1912) (emphasis added)).
16.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 347 (citations omitted).
17.
Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 379 Mich. 667, 686 (Mich.
1967).
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as doing so does not harm other water rights holders. 18 An early water
treatise went so far as to say: “The corpus of water, like a wild animal,
may be severed from its natural surroundings and be reduced to
possession, as for example, in a reservoir.”19 Part of what the western
states sought to accomplish by rejecting the riparian system and embracing
the appropriation system was to create secure, private rights in water that
would provide water users with incentives to make efficient and
productive use of a scarce water supply.
II.

NATURE OF PROPERTY INTERESTS IN WESTERN WATER

A.

A Bundle of Sticks

In real property cases, courts have often described property rights
as a “bundle of sticks,” meaning there can be many distinct interests in a
single parcel of land. For example, one individual may own the right to
use and occupy a parcel’s surface while another individual has the right to
develop its underlying minerals, a third person has the right to travel across
the surface pursuant to an easement, and a fourth person has a right to
utilize the airspace above the surface. Occasionally a landowner possesses
“fee simple” in a particular parcel, meaning that landowner controls the
parcel in all possible respects. More often, however, multiple individuals
control one or more sticks in a single bundle. Depending on which stick
or stocks a person owns, that person controls one or more resources of the
property.
To understand the parameters of any property right, one must
understand the types of interests that may exist in a particular resource. In
the case of land, a property interest can range from a mere easement to fee
simple. Most interests in land are less than fee simple, and all interests in
land are subject to the right of the state to regulate pursuant to its police
powers. Not all potential uses, including non-use, are compatible, so one
18.
See, e.g., Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 317 (Colo. 1891);
Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377–78 (Colo. 1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 85–2–403(1) (2017) (provides that water rights are an appurtenance with the
conveyance of land, unless previously severed or specifically exempted). Although
common law has upheld severability, alienability and assignability of water rights,
there are state law limits on alienability and severability.
19.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 346.
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interest may eclipse another. For example, the traditional rule is that the
mineral estate is dominant in relation to the surface estate, meaning the
mineral owner has the right to use the surface to the extent reasonably
necessary to develop the mineral resources. The value of a particular
interest in land is therefore determined by “the amount of in rem control a
person has,” and by the associated right to exclude others, which could be
considered a stick in the bundle. 20
Property interests in water rights, too, resemble a bundle of sticks.
One person might own a right to divert water for irrigation, while another
person has the right to float on the surface, a third has the right to fish in
the water, a fourth has a right use the flow of the stream to power a mill,
and a fifth has the right to dispose of waste in the water. Some of these
uses may be simultaneously compatible. For example, a mill can be
powered by water in which others have disposed of waste. But, for the
most part, water uses are not simultaneously compatible where uses
involve the diversion and/or consumption of water and others require a
minimum streamflow dependent upon the non-diversion and nonconsumption of water. Water diverted and consumed for irrigation cannot
be used downstream for fishing, floating, or powering a mill. Thus, most
rights in water have value because they are exclusive to the user and
dominant in relation to the rights others may possess in the same water.
This is the linchpin of the prior appropriation doctrine.
Historically, most western water rights were consumptive use of
water. Some, and often much, of the water would be returned to the
common source of supply, but while one used the water, others could not.
In fact, most western states required the diversion of water to perfect a
water right claim. While the diversion rule served to give notice and proof
of actual use, it also meant that water rights could only be had for out-ofstream uses. Thus, uses that did not require diversion, such as fishing
(with some narrow exceptions), navigation, or waste disposal, were not
recognized as a protectable property interest in the form of a water right.
Persons making in-stream uses of water effectively functioned as tenants
in common with everyone else using water in-stream. Generally, under
western appropriative water law, property rights in water were limited to
out-of-stream, consumptive uses that were superior to all other possible
uses while the water remained in the possession of the user. Former
Colorado Supreme Court Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. explained:
20.
ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL PROPERTY,
11–12 (1992).
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Western prior appropriation water law is a property
rights-based allocation and administration system which
promotes multiple use of a finite resource. The
fundamental characteristics of this system guarantee
security, assure reliability, and cultivate flexibility.
Security resides in the system’s ability to identify and
obtain protection for the right of use. Reliability springs
from the system’s assurance that the right of use will
continue to be recognized and enforced over time.
Flexibility emanates from the fact that other appropriators
not be injured by the change. 21
An appropriative water right is a freehold, exclusive, and
conditional interest. 22 Unlike ownership of a stick in the bundle of real
property rights, an appropriative water right is conditional because it may
be forfeited or abandoned by non-use.23 However, a water right’s
susceptibility to forfeiture does not diminish its constitutional protection.
In other words, a water right remains valid and constitutionally protected
subject to the legal grounds for forfeiture.
In most states, legal grounds for forfeiture include ceasing to put
water to a beneficial use. Beneficial use is an evolving definition, so a use
of water once recognized as beneficial can become non-beneficial and lose
its constitutional property protections as a result. 24 For example, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that the prior appropriation has
“evolved” to recognize uses of water that do not require physical diversion
of water:
Although our statutory scheme regulating the
appropriation of water has contemplated an actual
physical diversion of water, we have never said that a
requirement to do so existed. This is understandable if we
21.
Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical
Overview, 1 U. DENV.WATER L. REV. 1, 2 (1997).
22.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 346 (citations omitted).
23.
Id.
24.
Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d
972, 1007, 3 Cal.2d 489, 567 (Cal. 1935). (“What is a beneficial use at one time may,
because of changed conditions, become a waste of water at a later time.”).
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give consideration to that, until passage of our instream
flows act, it was necessary to actually divert water to put
it to a beneficial use permitted by law in Wyoming.
“Beneficial use” is, however, an evolving concept and can
be expanded to reflect changes in society’s recognition of
the value of new uses of our resources. Actual diversion
is neither constitutionally required nor an essential
element of our appropriation doctrine. Beneficial use is
the key element.25
“Beneficial use” could therefore evolve to leave some once-protected
water rights unprotected. This aspect—unique to property interests in
water—is no doubt a function of water’s scarcity, particularly in the
American West.
Therefore, based on the theory of the prior appropriation doctrine,
the two critical parameters of sticks (in the bundle of sticks) for a water
right are: 1) the date of first use establishing the property owner’s priority
in relation to other rights owners on the same stream, and 2) the amount
of water the owner is entitled to use. 26 On this issue the Montana Supreme
Court stated: “[p]roperty rights in water consist not alone in the amount of
the appropriation, but, also, in the priority of the appropriation . . . . Hence
to deprive a person of his priority is to deprive him of a most valuable
property right.” 27

B.

The “Usufructuary” Nature of A Water Right Does Not Diminish
the Constitutional Protection of the Property Interest

Water rights have long been described as usufructuary, meaning
the owner possesses a right to use the water as opposed to owning the
water itself.28 This description served to make clear that others may have
a right to use the same water at a different time and in a different place. It
recognized the transient nature of water and thus distinguished it from land
where a property owner may be said to own the dirt itself without affecting
25.
In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992).
26.
See Gen. Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 863 (Mont. 1975).
27.
Id.
28.
Murphy v. Kerr, 296 F. 536, 541 (1923).
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the rights of other real property owners. The common law’s recognition
of this pragmatic difference between the use of water and use of land has
been relied upon for claiming that water rights, because they are
usufructuary, are a less constitutionally protected form of property right. 29
The factor that gives any property right value, making it
something for which compensation must be paid if the right is taken, is the
control the property owner has over the use of the particular resource.
Land has value because of its potential uses and non-uses. Although true
that the right to exclude has constitutional value independent from the
economic value of land, deriving from control over use, the economic
value determines what compensation must be paid when land is taken. It
is the same with water rights. The economic value of a water right is
control over its use or non-use. In this sense, which is the only sense
relevant to the Takings Clause, the usufructuary nature of water rights
makes them similar to, rather than different from, land. However, the fact
that the main stick in the water rights bundle is the right of use in no way
lessens the constitutional protection afforded a water right. Much takings
jurisprudence has focused on land, but that does not mean that rights in
physically different resources like water or intellectual property warrant
any less constitutional protection. The owner’s exclusive rights of use or
non-use give those rights economic value.
Appropriative water rights are generally understood to be
usufructuary. A usufructuary interest consists of the right to use, but not
own, the water. 30 In 1911, Samuel C. Wiel described the prior
appropriation doctrine in terms of the law of capture, which had also been
applied to wildlife and petroleum:
(1) Running water in a natural stream is not the subject of
property, but is a wandering, changing thing without an

29.
See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Water Rights, Clean Water Act Section 404
Permitting, and the Takings Clause, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 911 (1989); Margaret
Z. Ferguson, Instream Appropriations and the Dormant Commerce Clause:
Conserving Water for the Future, 75 GEO. L.J. 1701, 1711 (1987).
30.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 349 (citing Wells A. Hutchins,
Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, Misc. Pub. No. 418 at 27
(USDA 1942)). See also Sherlock v. Greaves, 76 P.2d 87, 91 (Mont. 1938) (citations
omitted) (“We are committed to the rule that the appropriator of a water right does not
own the water, but has the ownership of its use only.”).
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owner, like the very fish swimming in it, or like wild
animals, the air in the atmosphere, and the negative
community in general. (2) With respect to this substance
the law recognizes a right to take and use of it, and to have
it flow to the taker so that it may be taken and used—a
usufructuary right. (3) When taken from its natural
stream, so much of the substance as is actually taken is
captured, and, passing under private possession and
control, becomes private property during the period of
possession.31
Although advocates of the uncompensated regulation of property
interests in water have made much of the usufructuary nature of a water
right, it should have no significance on the constitutional protections of
the Fifth Amendment. Interests in water rights are described differently
from interests in land because of the transient—and sometimes reusable—
nature of the resource. While land is generally most effectively used by
the actual possessor of the corpus of the resource, most water uses allow
repeated use by successive water rights holders. As Judge Loren A. Smith
stated, “[t]he property involved in this case is atypical of most takings
litigation. It is not land or minerals at a specific time, but rather the usage
of water which ebbs and flows throughout the year.” 32 The frequent,
accurate statement that water rights are usufructuary simply reflects the
physical nature of the resource and the requirements of a functional system
of property rights in that unique resource. Usufructuary was never
intended to express a peculiar limit on property rights in water or justify
unusually broad exercise of the police power. Property rights in water

31.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 349 (citing 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN
THE WESTERN STATES §§ 709, 739, 773–75, 792–95 (3d ed. 1911)).
32.

Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 573 (2002).
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have no lesser constitutional standing than property rights in land, 33 in
easements,34 in intellectual property, or in mineral estates. 35
Even though a property interest in water has different
characteristics than a property interest in land, it is generally considered to
be real property. 36 As Wiel stated nearly a century ago, “the right to the
flow and use of water being a right in a natural resource, is real estate.”37
A water right is considered real property in a quiet-title action, in a
mortgage recording instrument, when satisfying a statute of frauds, for
purposes of descent and inheritance, and for taxation. 38
For example, the Montana Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the
[water] right is fully perfected, that is, when there was a diversion of the
water and its application to a beneficial use, it thereupon became a
property right of which the owner could only be divested in some legal
manner.”39 Exactly thirty years later that same court stated:
The following concepts require no citation of authority:
One who has appropriated water in Montana acquires a
distinct property right; this water right is a species of
property in and of itself and may exist separate and
independent of a ditch right; each is capable of several and
33.
See, e.g., Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Colo.
1982); Gen. Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 863–64 (Mont. 1975; Harrer v. N.
Pac. Ry. Co., 410 P.2d 713, 715 (1966) (stating that water rights are “considered
property of the highest order”); Sheep Mountain Cattle Co. v. State Dep’t of Ecology,
726 P.2d 55, 57 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that “[p]roperty owners have a vested
interest in their water rights); Strait v. Brown, 16 Nev. 317, 322 (1881) (stating that
[t]here[’s] . . . no difficulty in recognizing a right to the use of water flowing in a
stream as private property).
34.
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262, 266–67 (1946).
35.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–15
(1922) (holding that coal interests were compensable property interest); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 45–46 (1960); Whitney Benefits v. United States, 18 Cl.
Ct. 394, 409 (1989).
36.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 345. See also Carson City v. Estate of
Lompa, 501 P.2d 662 (Nev. 1972).
37.
CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 345 n.4.
38.
Id. at 345 n.5.
39.
Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 62 P.2d 206, 210 (Mont. 1936); see
also Smith v. Denniff, 60 P. 398, 400 (1900) (stating that a water right is “a positive,
certain, and vested property right” of which the appropriator could not be divested).
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distinct injuries; both water rights and ditch rights are
considered property of the highest order. 40
Similarly, the Washington Court of Appeals stated, “[p]roperty owners
have a vested interest in their water rights, and these rights are entitled to
due process protection.”41 The Nevada Supreme Court reached the same
conclusion, holding: “[t]here is . . . no difficulty in recognizing a right to
the use of water flowing in a stream as private property.” 42
III.

TAKINGS LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO WATER
RIGHTS

The Fifth Amendment only requires that property owners be
compensated for the value of property rights taken. 43 The meaning of the
Fifth Amendment language, “nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation,” would be the same if it were written as
an affirmative authorization to take private property for a public use, upon
payment of just compensation. As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
stated in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States:
[w]hat is not at issue is whether the Government can
lawfully prevent a property owner from filling or
otherwise injuring or destroying vital wetlands . . . . The
question at issue here is, when the Government fulfills its
obligation to preserve and protect the public interest, may
the cost of obtaining that public benefit fall solely upon
the affected property owner, or is it to be shared by the
community at large.44
The police power of the state is in no way diminished by the
enforcement of the Takings Clause’s mandate for just compensation.
40.
Harrer v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 410 P.2d 713, 715 (Mont. 1966).
41.
Sheep Mountain Cattle Co. v. State Dep’t of Ecology, 726 P.2d 55,
57 (Wash. App. 1986).
42.
Strait v. Brown, 16 Nev. 317, 322 (Nev. 1881).
43.
U.S. Const. amend. V.
44.
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
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The Supreme Court decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard makes
clear that the purpose of the Takings Clause has nothing to do with the
extent of the police power and everything to do with the state’s ability to
redistribute wealth held in the form of property. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority stated: “One of the principal purposes of the
Takings Clause is to ‘bar government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.’” 45
A seminal Supreme Court case dealing with takings, Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., established a clearer approach to takings
jurisprudence by building on the fairness concept and deleting due process
analysis from the Fifth Amendment takings analysis. 46 In her opinion for
the Lingle majority, Justice O’Connor stated: “While scholars have offered
various justifications for this regime, we have emphasized its role in
‘bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole.’”47 In that case, the Court explained that the most important
takings inquiry was the impact of the government’s action on the property
owner:
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be
characterized as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in
Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central) share a common
touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory actions that
are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which
government directly appropriates private property or
ousts the owners from his domain. Accordingly, each of
these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden
that government imposes upon private property rights.
The Court has held that physical takings require
compensation because of the burden they impose: A
permanent physical invasion, however minimal the
economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s rights to
exclude others from entering and using her property–
perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests. In
45.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (citing Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
46.
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–42, 545 (2005).
47.
Id. at 537 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
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the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of
a property’s value is the determinative factor. And the
Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not
exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s
economic impact and the degree to which it interferes
with legitimate property interests. 48
Similar to Lingle, the Court of Federal Claims in Tulare 49 started
its analysis with the same often-quoted sentence from Armstrong v. United
States discussing fairness. 50 After disposing of some contract legal
theories, the Court of Federal Claims determined the nature of the alleged
taking:
Courts have traditionally divided their analysis of Fifth
Amendment takings into two categories: physical takings
and regulatory takings. A physical taking occurs when
the government’s action amounts to a physical occupation
or invasion of property, including the functional
equivalent of a “practical ouster of [the owner’s]
possession.” Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635,
642, 25 L.Ed. 336 (1878); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164,
73 L.Ed. 2d 868 (1982). When an owner has suffered a
physical invasion of his property, courts have noted that
“no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how
weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required
compensation.”
A regulatory taking, in contrast, arises when the
government’s regulation restricts the use to which an
owner may put his property. In assessing whether a
regulatory taking has occurred, courts generally employ
the balancing test set forth in Penn Central, weighing the
character of the government action, the economic impact
of that action and the reasonableness of the property
48.
Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
49.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.Cl.
313, 316 (2001).
50.
Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
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owner’s investment-backed expectations. Regulations
that are found to be too restrictive, however—i.e., those
that deprive property of its entire economically beneficial
or productive use—are commonly identified as
categorical takings and, like physical takings, require no
such balancing.51
In Tulare, the Court of Federal Claims faced the intersection of “the
Endangered Species Act and California’s century-old regime of private
water rights . . . and the proper balance between them . . . .” 52 That court’s
use of the word “balance” seemed to foreshadow that a regulatory takings
analysis would be applied to the plaintiff’s claim for loss of water rights
due to ESA-imposed restrictions. However, the court viewed the taking of
water rights as a physical taking, reasoning:
In the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use—
the hallmark of a regulatory action—completely
eviscerates the right itself since plaintiffs’ sole
entitlement is to the use of water. Unlike other species of
property where use restrictions may limit some, but not
all of the incidents of ownership, the denial of a right to
the use of water accomplishes a complete extinction of all
value. . . . That complete occupation of property—an
exclusive possession of plaintiffs’ water-use rights for
preservation of fish—mirrors the [physical] invasion
present in Causby. To that extent, then, that the federal
government, by preventing plaintiffs from using the water
to which they would otherwise have been entitled, have
rendered the usufructuary right to that water valueless,
they have thus effected a physical taking. 53
United States v. Causby, is the physical takings case involving real
property referenced by the Tulare Court.54 In Causby, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that frequent flights immediately above a
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 318.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 319.
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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landowner’s property constituted a taking because: “If, by reason of the
frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this land
for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as if the United
States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive
possession of it.” 55 The fact that an appropriative water right is
usufructuary therefore supports, rather than undercuts, the conclusion that
any government action that limits a water right holder from using the water
constitutes a per se, physical taking. A mere restriction on use—the
hallmark of a regulatory action—completely eviscerates the right itself
because a water right holder’s sole entitlement is to the use of water.
After Lingle and Lucas, the trend in takings cases indicates that
courts will require just compensation when the state chooses to reallocate
resources at the expense of private landowners. As the Tulare Court held,
this same approach to interpretation of the Takings Clause does apply
equally to private rights in water.
Although this trend evidences something of a changing approach
to takings claims Fifth Amendment jurisprudence continues to reflect a
structured analysis which should be expected to apply in takings claims
involving water rights. That analysis poses the following questions in
order:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Is there a constitutionally-protected property right?
Is the government action a categorical taking?
Has there been a partial taking?
On balance, do the public benefits of the regulation
justify the burden on private property?
E. If there is a taking, what is the value of just
compensation for the taking?
If regulations depriving use of water rights were consistently viewed by
courts as per se, physical takings as in Tulare—an approach advocated
by the authors—the analysis would be much simpler.

55.

Id. at 261.
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Is There A Constitutionally-Protected Property Right?

More than three decades ago, the Supreme Court stated that,
“[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.” 56 The Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals stated, “[t]he Constitution neither creates nor defines the scope of
property interests compensable under the Fifth Amendment,” which
interests instead are defined by “‘existing rules or understandings’ and
‘background principles’ derived from an independent source, such as state,
federal or common law.” 57 In Lucas, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
state law determines the “bundle of sticks” that inhere in a property
owner’s title.58 Therefore, “[f]irst, a court determines whether the plaintiff
possesses a valid interest in the property affected by the government
action.”59
As water rights are recognized as property rights under state law, 60
they are entitled to the same constitutional protection as any form of
property.61 Furthermore, courts have long recognized that water rights are

56.
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). Even though
states can define the extent and nature of property rights, this does not mean a state
can willy nilly change property rights. In fact, the federal Takings Clause prohibits
government, including state government, from taking property even by redefinition,
without compensation, unless this was an acknowledged condition of the property
right.
57.
Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)).
58.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n. 7 (1992).
59.
Karuk Tribe v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Skip
Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 870 (1995) (citing United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319
U.S. 266, 281 (1943). See also Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl.
504 (2005) (the court determined that pursuant to Oregon state law, plaintiffs did not
have a state-defined property interest in their use Bureau of Reclamation delivered
water).
60.
Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 222, 230–32 (2005).
61.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl.
313, 319 (2001).
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controlled by state law because Congress has repeatedly enacted laws
specifying that state law governs private water rights. 62
Normally, the parameters of real property rights include the right
to exclude others, 63 the right of possession, 64 and the right to alienate. 65
Because of the peculiar nature of the water resource, water rights are
deemed usufructuary rights and are defined by elements such as source,
flow rate and/or volume, priority date, and purpose. 66 Former Colorado
Supreme Court Justice Hobbs described a Colorado water right as:
[A] right to use beneficially a specified amount of water,
from the available supply of surface water or tributary
groundwater, that can be captured, possessed, and
controlled in priority under a decree, to the exclusion of
all others not then in priority under a decreed water right.
A water right comes into existence only through
application of the water to the appropriator’s beneficial
use; that beneficial use then becomes the basis, measure,
and limit of the appropriation. 67
62.
See, e.g., Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 612–
13 (1978) (discussing Congress’ early regulation of federal land); California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645, 656 (1978) (stating Congress intended to recognize as valid the
customary law with respect to the use of water which had grown up among the
occupants of public land under the peculiar necessities of their condition); Act of July
9, 1870, 16 Stat. 218, 41 Cong. Ch. 236 (Congress ensured occupants of federal public
land would be bound by state water law, by providing that “all patents granted, or
preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued water
rights”); Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158 (1935)
(stating that the 1877 Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377, “effected a severance of
all water upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself”).
63.
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–180 (1979) (“The
right to exclude, so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right,
falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation.”).
64.
Cox Cable San Diego v. County of San Diego, 185 Cal. App. 3d 368,
376 (1986) (“[R]eal property includes the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or
right to the possession of land….”).
65.
Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2000).
66.
Mont. Code Ann. § 85–2–234(6) (2017).
67.
Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46,
53 (Colo. 1999) (citations omitted).
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Due to the prior appropriation doctrine, two primary elements of
a water right are: (1) the amount of water that has been put to beneficial
use and (2) the priority of water rights relative to each other. 68 Changing
what constitutes beneficial use or shuffling priority dates can therefore
diminish the value of, or “take,” that right. 69 The prior appropriation
doctrine greatly values use of water rights, so much so that non-use or nonbeneficial use can result in forfeiture. 70
Beneficial use can also serve as the measure of protection afforded
or not afforded to an appropriative water right. As the Federal Circuit has
described California water rights:
Although appropriative water rights are viewed as
property under California law, those rights are limited to
the “beneficial use” of the water involved. This principle,
set forth explicitly in the California Constitution, limits
water rights holders to the use of the amount of water
“reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served
. . . .” The same limitation is found in the California Water
Code. California courts have found the beneficial use
limitation a valid exercise of state power to regulate water
rights for public benefit and have deemed it an
“overriding constitutional limitation” on those rights. 71
Similar to this California case, Montana’s Supreme Court allowed the
state’s Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (“DNRC”) to
modify the beneficial use of water during an administrative process to
change a water right.72 The DNRC decreased the volume of the water right
based on the department’s calculation of consumptive use, which therefore
allowed the DNRC to modify the beneficial use element of a water right. 73
This is arguably an unconstitutional taking of a water right.

68.
State Dept. of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993).
69.
General Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 166 Mont. 510, 516–
17 (Mont. 1975) (“Priority in appropriation of water is a valuable right. . . . [T]o
deprive a person of his priority is to deprive him of a most valuable property right.”).
70.
Mont. Code Ann. § 85–2–227(3) (2017).
71.
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1354–55
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
72.
Hohenlohe v. State, 240 P.3d 628, 357 Mont. 438 (Mont. 2010).
73.
Id. at ¶ 70.
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Overall, water rights in western states are protected so long as they
are put to beneficial use by the rights holder, although like real property,
they remain subject to the government’s power to take that right pursuant
to due process and in conformance with the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause. The value of a water right rests entirely on the right to use water.
Thus, any government action that precludes use of the water right deprives
the owner of some—or arguably all as recognized in Tulare––of the
economic value of the water right, meaning just compensation must be
paid to the owner.

B.

IS THE GOVERNMENT ACTION A CATEGORICAL TAKING?

In Lucas, the Court acknowledged that although it had not
followed any “set formula” in its takings analysis, the case law had
established “two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable
without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support
of the restraint.”74 The two categorical, or per se, takings situations are
physical invasion of property and regulation that denies all economically
beneficial use of the property. 75
1. Is There A Physical Invasion of the “Usufructuary Right”?
A physical invasion occurs when property is physically occupied
as a consequence of state action or regulation.76 The most obvious case of
physical invasion occurs when government seeks to locate public facilities
like roads and buildings on private property. As the Court stated in Dolan,
“In general . . . no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how
weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation [for
physical invasions].”77 Recently, the imposition of exactions has tempered
this requirement. For example, in Dolan, the Supreme Court recognized
that conditions imposed by a city on its approval of a building permit,
including “[d]edications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are

74.
75.
76.

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
Id.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426

77.

Id.

(1982).
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generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a
proposed property use.” 78
The theory of this per se takings category was explained in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation,79 a case involving a
relatively minor––1.5 square foot––state-mandated, physical invasion of
private property:
To the extent that the government permanently occupies
physical property, it effectively destroys each of these
rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the
occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude
the occupier from possession and use of the space. The
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of
the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of
property rights.80
The Court went on to say that regulations which result in a
“permanent physical occupation” or in a “temporary physical invasion” of
property are essentially the same as a governmental condemnation
requiring just compensation. 81 Although the Court has declined to expand
the physical invasion category to include regulations which force a
property owner to accept less than market value from a tenant, 82 federal
courts have consistently held that governmental orders that deprive
landowners of the right to exclude others from their property are per se
takings.83
Courts traditionally begin a physical takings inquiry by first
determining whether the government action appropriated the private
property. For example, one court stated, “the essential inquiry is whether
the injury to the claimant’s property is in the nature of a tortious invasion
78.
79.

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1994).
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419

(1982).
80.
Id. at 435.
81.
Id. at 436 n. 12.
82.
E.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
83.
See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n 483 U.S. 825, 831–32
(1987); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that an
EPA order that authorized access to private property to install and maintain a
monitoring well was a per se taking).
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of his rights or rises to the magnitude of an appropriation of some interest
in his property permanently to the use of the [g]overnment.” 84 This
“appropriation” inquiry readily applies to appropriative water rights given
that “it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage which
results from it’ that determines whether a taking occurred.” 85
Because water is transient and not possessed in the same way as
land, it may appear at first glance that water rights are not subject to
physical invasion. As the court recognized in Hage, “[t]he property
involved in this case is atypical of most takings litigation. It is not land or
minerals at a specific time, but rather the usage of water which ebbs and
flows throughout the year.”86
However, an important trilogy of United States Supreme Court
cases, beginning with International Paper Co. v. United States,
established that regulation restricting the use of water is a physical
invasion amounting to a taking of private water rights by the government. 87
During World War I, the United States issued a requisition order for all
hydroelectric power from the Niagara Falls Power Company. 88 The power
company leased a portion of its water to plaintiff International Paper
Company, which diverted the water via a canal to its mill. 89 In response
to the United States’ order to “cut off the water being taken” by
International Paper to increase hydroelectric power production, Niagara
Power ceased diverting water to International Paper.90 International Paper
was unable to operate its mill for nearly ten months as a result. 91 Although
the government did not physically take over the operations of either
Niagara Power or International Paper, nor did it physically direct the flow

84.

National By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1273–74

(1969).
85.
Baird v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 324, 329 (1984) (quoting United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327).
(1917)).
86.
Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 573 (Fed. Cl. 2002).
87.
282 U.S. 399 (1931).
88.
Id. at 405.
89.
Id. at 404–05.
90.
Id. at 405–06.
91.
Id. at 406.
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of water, the Supreme Court still found that the government directly
appropriated water that International Paper had a right to use. 92
In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., Gerlach possessed
riparian water rights for irrigation of its grasslands by natural seasonal
overflow of the San Joaquin River in California.93 After the United States
Bureau of Reclamation built Friant Dam upstream of Gerlach’s land, “a
dry river bed” was left downstream of the dam, and the overflow irrigation
of Gerlach’s lands virtually ceased. 94 The United States had caused water
to be physically diverted away from Gerlach for storage and delivery to
third parties who held water contracts.95 While the Friant Dam served a
public purpose of “mak[ing] water available where it would be of the
greatest service,” the Supreme Court concluded the government’s action
was a physical taking. 96
In Dugan v. Rank, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the
distinction between regulatory and physical takings analysis with respect
to water rights. 97 Dugan also involved claims arising out of the United
States’ physical diversion of water for use by third parties through
construction of the Friant Dam. Landowners along the San Joaquin River
who owned riparian and other rights in the river alleged that the Bureau of
Reclamation’s upstream storage of water behind Friant Dam left
insufficient water to supply their water rights.98 The Supreme Court again
characterized the government’s action as a physical taking. 99
In Tulare, the Court relied on this trilogy of cases to hold that
plaintiff’s assertion of a physical taking was the correct analysis because,
“the distinction between a physical invasion and a governmental activity
that merely impairs the use of that property turns on whether the intrusion
is ‘so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment

92.
Id. at 407 (“The petitioner’s right was to the use of the water; and
when all the water that it used was withdrawn from the petitioner’s mill and turned
elsewhere by government requisition for the production of power it is hard to see what
more the Government could do to take the use.”).
93.
339 U.S. 725, 729–30 (1950).
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 728.
97.
372 U.S. 609, 614 (1963).
98.
Id. at 616.
99.
Id. at 625–26.
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of the property and to limit his exploitation of it.’”100 Tulare analogized a
government restriction on the use of water rights to a physical taking of
land, reasoning that the water rights had been rendered useless in the same
manner that land had been rendered useless by the frequency and altitude
of overhead flights in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265
(1946).101
Tulare and the trilogy of Supreme Court cases would go on to
inform the 2008 Casitas decision. Casitas recognized that a physical
taking is the paradigmatic form of a taking and occurs by direct
government appropriation or physical invasion of private property. 102
Casitas also recognized that two categories of regulatory action can be
deemed per se takings in the same manner that physical takings are viewed
as per se takings. 103 These categories are: (1) when the government
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical property invasion,
however minor––as in Loretto––and (2) when regulation completely
deprives an owner of all economically beneficial property use, as in Lucas.
Regulatory takings outside of those narrow categories are governed by
Penn Central analysis.104 The Casitas Court turned to the trilogy of
Supreme Court cases for guidance, noting that in all three, “the United
States physically diverted the water, or caused water to be diverted away
from the plaintiffs’ property.”105
Casitas found that the governmental regulation at issue resulted in
a physical diversion of water away from the plaintiff: “[T]he government
did not merely require some water to remain in stream, but instead actively
caused the physical diversion of water away from the [plaintiff’s canal] . .
. .”106 Although not all of the plaintiff’s water was taken, in the context of
physical takings jurisprudence, any impairment, however minor, is a
taking.107 The fact that the government took Casitas’ water for a public
purpose––the preservation of endangered fish under the Endangered
100. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl.
313, 319 (2001) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946)).
101. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319.
102. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
103. Id. at 1288–89.
104. Katzin v. United States, 908 F.3d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
105. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1289–90.
106. Id. at 1291.
107. Id. at 1290 (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963)).
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Species Act––did not diminish the nature of the physical taking. “When
the government forces Casitas to divert water away from the RoblesCasitas Canal to the fish ladder for the public purpose of protecting West
Coast Steelhead Trout, this is a governmental use of the water.” 108 Any
diversion of a private, usufructuary water right for a public purpose is a
per se taking. 109 “The active hand of the government,” in diverting water
away from Casitas, “permanently” took that water from Casitas. 110 The
taking of water “is not temporary, and it does not leave the right in the
same state it was before the government action. The water, and Casitas’
right to use that water, is forever gone.”111
Recently, in Klamath, the Court of Federal Claims revisited the
issue of whether a taking of water rights should be analyzed as regulatory
or physical taking. 112 The plaintiffs are water users in the Klamath River
Basin, which receives water from the Klamath Irrigation Project. 113 The
United States Bureau of Reclamation operates the Klamath Irrigation
Project.114 The irrigation project’s “dual purposes of serving agricultural
uses and providing for the needs of wildlife” are “subject to the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act.” 115 In order to comply with
the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, the Bureau of
Reclamation withheld delivery of irrigation water for several months. 116
When water was finally released, it was alleged to have been too late in
the growing season to grow crops.
The Klamath court began its inquiry into whether the plaintiffs
had suffered a physical or regulatory taking of their water rights by noting:
Decisions of the Supreme Court have drawn a clear line
between physical and regulatory takings. The former
involves a physical occupation or destruction of property,
while the latter involve restrictions on the use of the

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 1292–93.
Id. at 1292.
Id.
Id. at 1296.
Klamath Irrigation v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 722 (2016).
Id. at 724.
Id.
Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 726.
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property. The distinction is important because physical
takings constitute per se takings and impose a categorical
duty on the government to compensate the owner,
whereas regulatory takings generally require balancing
and complex factual assessments, using the so-called
Penn Central test. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has held that our focus should
primarily be on the character of the government action
when determining whether a physical or regulatory taking
has occurred. 117
The court then noted the facts it was presented with were “very similar to
those in Casitas.” 118 It cited Casitas for its determination that “the
appropriate reference point in time to determine whether the United States
caused a physical diversion is the status quo before the challenged
government action.” 119 For users of irrigation water in the Klamath Basin,
the status quo prior to the government’s action was “generally receiv[ing]
as much water for irrigation as they needed.” 120 By refusing to release
water, “the government prevented water that would have, under the status
quo ante, flowed into the Klamath Project and to the plaintiffs.” 121
Governmental action “arrested and diverted waters destined for the
plaintiffs in the same manner the Supreme Court found to have caused a
physical taking in Gerlach and Dugan.”122 The Bureau of Reclamation’s
retention of water “amount[s] to a physical diversion of water.” 123 The
Klamath court then found that a regulatory taking analysis was not
appropriate because governmental action, not regulation, deprived the
plaintiffs of their water.124 Accordingly, the government’s actions should
have been analyzed as a per se, physical taking. 125

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 730.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734–35.
Id. at 737.
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Has There Been A Partial Taking?

Current Supreme Court takings doctrine draws a distinction
between partial and total takings. In Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis, the Court found no taking where a state
regulation required owners of coal to leave 50 percent of the minable coal
in place.126 In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist challenged the majority’s
broad definition of the relevant mass of property to consider when
analyzing a taking:
I see no reason for refusing to evaluate the impact of the
Subsidence Act on the support estate alone, for
Pennsylvania has clearly defined it as a separate estate in
property. . . . I do not understand the Court to mean that
one holding the support estate alone would find it
worthless, for surely the owners of the mineral estate or
surface estates would be willing buyers of this interest. . .
. In these circumstances, where the estate defined by state
law is both severable and of value in its own right, it is
appropriate to consider the effect of the regulation on that
particular property interest.127
Three forms of partial takings exist. One is where a stick in the
bundle of rights is taken, but the other sticks remain. The result is a
reduction in, but not elimination of, economic value. A second occurs
where all sticks in the bundle are retained, but with restrictions on the use
of one or more sticks. The third form of partial taking occurs where a
regulation is applied to only a portion of the physical extent of the
property. Under current takings jurisprudence, the first form is a taking of
the whole of a severable stick and is indefensible as Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued. The second form is what Penn Central’s balancing test
applies to and is therefore only defensible if Penn Central remains
defensible. The third form, however, is wholly indefensible in light of a
physical occupation analysis.
126. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987). The uncertainties of current takings law are well illustrated by the comparison
of this case to the Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon case in which, on very similar facts,
the Court found a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
127. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S., at 519.
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This distinction in jurisprudence between partial and total takings
is indefensible except as a justification for engaging in the uncompensated
regulation of private property. The courts would not excuse a burglar who
takes only part of his victim’s wealth, nor would the courts forgive a state
if it took even a small percentage from random citizens’ bank accounts.
From the point of view of the burglary victim or a person whose property
is subject to regulation, there is no principled distinction between a partial
and a total taking.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s focus on the severable sticks of the
property rights bundle is persuasive in demonstrating that taking one stick
from the bundle can amount to a total taking. There is no logical reason
to distinguish the partial and total takings of a single stick in the bundle,
especially in the bundle of property interests in water rights where only a
single stick––the right of use––provides the true measure of economic
value. In terms of economic impact, the difference is one of degree, but
the Fifth Amendment does not permit for distinctions of degree in the
redistribution of wealth. 128
Since Lucas, these issues have received close attention in the
Federal Circuit. In Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,129 the
appeals court held that a takings analysis is not an “all or nothing
proposition.” 130 Although the Federal Circuit remanded the case back to
the Court of Federal Claims, which had found for the property owner, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the trial court “was correct in theory” in
finding a regulatory taking when less than seven percent of a parcel was
immediately affected by a regulation that did not deny the total value of
even that small portion.131
128. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 124, 115
(1978) (Supreme Court decisions have not been without suggestions that the wealth
of affected property owners is relevant to whether or not a taking has occurred. The
Penn Central majority thought it relevant that Penn Central owned other properties
in Manhattan.); See also DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 478–79 (it was considered relevant
that Keystone owned other properties in western Pennsylvania); C.f. Michael C.
Blumm, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles As Categorical
Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005) (provides an extreme view
that endorses the concepts expressed in Penn Central and DeBenedictis).
129. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
130. Id. at 1572.
131. Id. at 1567.
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Florida Rock owned 1,560 acres for which they had applied for a
permit to dredge and fill wetlands under section 404 of the Clean Water
Act. The United States Army Corps of Engineers would only consider an
application for 98 acres (the amount Florida Rock could mine in three
years), so Florida Rock applied for a permit for 98 acres. That application
was denied by the Corps based on its conclusion that the proposed mining
would cause irremediable loss of an ecologically valuable wetland parcel
and would create undesirable water turbidity. 132 The trial court concluded
that the 98 acres were worth $10,500 per acre before the regulation and
$500 per acre after imposition of the regulation, a diminution in value of
about 95 percent. The Federal Circuit questioned the method of
assessment, and therefore the $500 per acre figure, but not the principle
that less than total loss of value might be a taking. 133 “Nothing in the
language of the Fifth Amendment compels a court to find a taking only
when the Government divests the total ownership of the property;” wrote
Judge Plager for the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, “the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the uncompensated taking of private property
without reference to the owner’s remaining property interests.” 134
In a subsequent opinion, Judge Plager addressed in Loveladies
Harbor v. United States what he labels “the denominator problem.135 The
denominator problem is what happens when the determination of whether
a categorical taking depends on how much of the property owner’s
property is impacted by the regulation. 136 The claimants had been denied
a Section 404 permit to fill 12.5 acres of wetlands on a 51-acre parcel
which had been part of a larger 250-acre parcel.137 The claimants had
already developed and sold most of the 199 acres not included in the
remaining 51 acres and agreed to dedicate 38.5 acres to the State of New
Jersey in return for a state permit to develop the remaining 12.5 acres. 138
These facts presented the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with
132. Id. at 1563.
133. Id. at 1567.
134. Id. at 1569.
135. 28 F.3d 1171, 1180 (1994).
136. Id. For example, if one owner owns all 10 acres that are being
impacted by a regulation and the adjoining, second land owner owns a total of 50
acres, but only 5 acres are being impacted, which would mean that the second
landowner still had residual value in his property and therefore did not experience a
categorical taking.
137. Id. at 1173–74.
138. Id. at 1174.
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several possible denominators in a fraction expressing the diminution in
value resulting from the challenged regulatory action. Judge Plager opted
for a denominator of 12.5 acres because the claimant no longer owned the
already developed lands and had agreed to dedicate the remaining 38.5
acres to the State. The Court stated:
Logically, the amount of just compensation should be
proportional to the value of the interest taken as compared
to the total value of the property, up to and including total
deprivation, whether the taking is by physical occupation
for the public to use as a park, or by regulatory imposition
to preserve the property as a wetland so that it may be
used by the public for ground water recharge and other
ecological purposes.” 139
The Florida Rock majority at the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that logic does not permit a distinction between partial takings
where there is physical occupation of property and partial takings where
there is ‘mere’ regulation.140 The majority thus rejected the possibility of
simply precluding regulatory takings from the reach of the Fifth
Amendment, and was left with the problem of distinguishing between “a
partial regulatory taking and the mere ‘diminution in value’ that often
accompanies otherwise valid regulatory impositions.” 141 Justice Holmes
saw the same dilemma in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where he
stated, because “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law,” 142 the judiciary’s task is to determine when
government regulation goes “too far.”143 This formulation, according to
the Florida Rock majority, “requires case by case adjudication,” an
approach which they believe their opinion follows.144 The Court stated,
“[p]roperty owners and regulators, attempting to predict whether a
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
1994).

18 F.3d at 1569.
Id.
Id.
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
Id. at 415.
Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir.
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governmental regulation has gone too far, will still need to use judgment
and exercise care in making decisions.”145
Although the Florida Rock opinion does not provide “a bright line,
simply drawn,” 146 it eliminates some of the “ad hocery” problem. Taken
by itself, the “too far” language from Pennsylvania Coal is not helpful in
drawing the distinction between regulatory taking and incidental
diminution in value. 147 But the Florida Rock majority applied Holmes’
concept of “reciprocity of advantage” from Penn Central to draw what is
in fact a fairly clear line: “When there is reciprocity of advantage, . . . then
the claim that the Government has taken private property has little force:
the claimant has in a sense been compensated by the public program
‘adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.’”148 If there are “direct compensating benefits accruing to
the property, and others similarly situated, flowing from the regulatory
environment,” 149 the regulation will satisfy the Fifth Amendment. But if
regulatory benefits are “shared through the community and the society,
while the costs are focused on a few,” the Fifth Amendment requires
compensation.150 This is true where the affected property is less than the
“owner’s entire fee estate” and “whether the taking results from a physical
or regulatory action.” 151

145. Id. at 1571.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1568. (“Since the Supreme Court’s decision in [Pennsylvania
Coal], the problem for courts has been to determine the extent to which the Fifth
Amendment burdens the exercise of the police power through regulation, that is, to
determine when a particular regulation somehow—in the words of Justice Holmes—
goes “too far,” and therefore effects a taking.”).
148. Id. at 1570. As Richard Epstein has pointed out, the better analysis
is that there has been a taking, but there is no Fifth Amendment violation because it
has been implicitly compensated in the form of reciprocal benefits to all affected
property owners.
149. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d at 1571.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1572 (“There has never been any question but that the
Government can take any kind of recognized estate or interest in property it chooses
in an eminent domain proceeding; it is not limited to fee interests. We see no reason
or support for a different rule in inverse condemnation cases, and that is true whether
the taking results from a physical or regulatory action.”).
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On Balance, Do the Public Benefits of the Regulation Justify the
Burden On Private Property?

After first determining whether the government regulation takes a
property right defined by state law, and second, whether there is a per se
or physical taking, or whether there is a partial taking, Supreme Court
takings doctrine, like much of current constitutional law, ultimately
requires a balancing of interests. In takings cases, the courts must balance
the property owner’s loss against the public benefits. This balancing test
grows directly out of the legacy of Penn Central, but it is the inevitable
consequence of the “too far” test from Pennsylvania Coal.152
In Penn Central, the Court held that three criteria are relevant to
whether or not a regulation results in a taking: (1) the character of the
governmental action, (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the
property owner, and (3) the extent to which the regulation interferes with
distinct investment-backed expectations.153 Because balancing tests are
by their nature ad hoc, it is impossible to generalize about the likely
outcome in water rights taking cases. However, the economic impacts of
loss of water can be substantial and water users often invest heavily in
water rights, so there is no reason to expect that property rights in water
would be treated any differently than other property interests. In fact, in
Tulare, the court awarded $13,915,364.78 plus interest as compensation
for the taking of water rights. 154
Although Penn Central’s balancing test has not been abandoned
by the Supreme Court, the Court’s recent takings decisions have avoided
the judicial policy-making inherent in balancing tests. The combination
of the Lucas expansion of categorical takings to include total loss of
economic value and the apparent recognition of compensable partial
takings has made it easier to find for the property owner without engaging
in a balancing of the private burden imposed and the public benefit gained.
While a court could find that property owners have “shown that their
private interest in developing and utilizing their property outweighs the
152. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom
Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 829
(2006).
153. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
154. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl.
246, 266 (Fed. Cl. 2003).
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public value in . . . [the regulation],”155 courts instead frequently defer to
legislative judgment about the net public benefits of a regulation of
property.156
Absent an express abandonment of the Penn Central balancing
test, water rights are subject to the same uncertainties which affect all
property rights. However, in Loveladies Harbor, the Federal Circuit
opined that the Supreme Court had abandoned the Penn Central balancing
test in its Lucas opinion.157 The Loveladies Harbor court stated, “[t]he
question was not one of balance between competing public and private
claims. Rather the question is simply one of basic property ownership
rights: within the bundle of rights which property lawyers understand to
constitute property, is the right or interest at issue, as a matter of law,
owned by the property owner or reserved to the state?”158 In its earlier
opinion in Florida Rock, the Federal Circuit had acknowledged the
continued viability of the Penn Central balancing test, but had identified
a fundamental flaw in the balancing approach when it observed that
reference to “the purpose and function of the regulatory imposition . . . [in
distinguishing] between mere diminution and partial taking should not be
read to suggest that when Government acts in pursuit of an important
public purpose, its actions are excused from liability.” 159 There is no
reason to conclude that where a balancing test is applied, property interests
in water should carry less weight than other property interests.
The illogic of the Penn Central balancing test is illustrated by the
contrasting values at stake in Loretto and Penn Central. Examples of the
difference in values include the unconstitutional invasion in the Loretto
case where economic loss for the property owner was minimal––far less
than the costs resulting from the prohibition in Penn Central on the use of
the valuable air space above Grand Central Terminal.160 Yet the property
155.

Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 399 (Cl. Ct.

1988).
156. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(determining that taking property for commercial development was a net public
benefit).
157. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1178–79.
158. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1179.
159. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
160. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (holding that a regulation requiring an apartment building owner to allow
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owner prevailed in Loretto and was denied compensation in Penn Central.
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld a New York City
landmark ordinance in the face of a Fifth Amendment challenge, even
though the ordinance dramatically reduced the value of Penn Central’s
property.161 The issue in Penn Central was whether the regulation’s
impact on the property owner, which fell well short of denying all
economically beneficial use of the property, went “far enough” to
constitute a compensable taking. 162
In Penn Central the Court acknowledged that––”The question of
what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has
proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty” 163––and admitted that
it had been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining when a
regulation goes so far as to require compensation. 164 The Court then
proceeded to identify the significant factors from previous regulatory
takings cases: the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
(especially with regards to the claimant’s distinct investment-backed
expectations), the nature of the governmental action, whether the
governmental action is reasonably necessary to effect a substantial public
purpose, and whether the government action can be characterized as the
acquisition of a resource to facilitate a uniquely public function. 165
Many of these questions raised in a Penn Central analysis have
already been addressed in prior tiers of takings analysis. The character of
governmental action is part of the substantial nexus question raised in the
legitimate government interest or due process analysis that the Court
determined was not part of a takings analysis. 166 It is redundant to apply
these same tests especially to a water right in which value is entirely
dependent on the right of use. Therefore, there is no need to balance
whether the property owner retains any value since taking the use right
takes everything.
cable television access to private property was a taking; but c.f. Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (the Penn Central Court did not find
a taking when the historic preservation law forbade the construction of an office
building on private property). The latter situation was not a taking and yet had a much
greater impact on the property owner).
161. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 104.
162. Id. at 130–36.
163. Id. at 123.
164. Id. at 124.
165. Id. at 124–28.
166. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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The Penn Central analysis is pre-Lucas, pre-Dolan and pre-Lingle
where the Court clarified several of the tiers of takings analysis. The
Lucas case clearly refined the second tier of per se takings situations,
which is whether there is categorical taking. Perhaps it is time to collapse
the multi-factor balancing test into the second and third tiers of analysis
where it seems to belong, especially in the case of takings analysis
involving western water rights. As a fourth-tier inquiry, the multi-factor
test is somewhat circular.
Under the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test, the outcome
would depend upon an ad hoc, case by case, factual analysis. In Lingle,
however, the Court resurrected dormant language from older cases and
stated, “One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is ‘to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.’”167 The Court has also stated, “A strong public desire to improve
the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for change.” 168 Such language
indicates that the Court is resurrecting the principles embodied in the Fifth
Amendment. The result of the Court’s renewed resolve to apply the Fifth
Amendment more rigorously means that the ad hoc inquiry performed by
lower courts may face a higher level of scrutiny by the Supreme Court in
the future. Therefore, if the lower courts applied takings analyses with
consistency, there may no longer by what seems to be such an ad hoc
approach to takings cases from the lower courts up to the Supreme Court.
Any government action or regulation that denies an owner use of
an appropriative water right without compensation is subject to a takings
challenge. Such regulations as the Endangered Species Act, wetlands
regulations, water quality regulations, or any other government regulation
that denies a water rights holder the use of an appropriative water right,
are most likely a per se taking of the water right without compensation.
Many will agree that most if not all of these regulations provide
some public benefit; however that is not a criterion used to determine a
taking. As Chief Justice Rehnquist said, the desire to improve public
conditions does not justify circumventing the “constitutional way” of
167.

Id. at 536–37 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49

(1960)).
168. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (citing
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
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paying the property owner. 169 The Fifth Amendment acknowledges that
private property can be taken for a public purpose, but only if just
compensation is paid.
IV.

DO BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF STATE LAW OR THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE ALLOW THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT TO TAKE WATER RIGHTS WITHOUT
COMPENSATION?

The public trust doctrine has been touted as the best means to
justify limitations on water rights without the need for compensation for
water rights holders.170 The theory is that public rights under the public
trust doctrine pre-date all appropriative water rights and therefore have
priority under the prior rights doctrine. Of course, public use advocates
would rather not have to pay, and the public trust doctrine provides a trump
of existing rights, assuming the doctrine can be demonstrated to apply to
the waters in question and to include the public uses being advocated. But
the common law public trust doctrine was always limited to navigation
and fishing in navigable waters. While a few courts have expanded both
the protected public uses and the affected waters the doctrine remains of
limited scope in most states. 171 Thus, justifying constraints on water rights
for other public purposes and on non-navigable waters requires that courts
effectively amend that longstanding common law doctrine. A taking
without compensation could also result from the Endangered Species Act
as occurred in Tulare and Casitas, if courts view wetlands regulations
legislation, or water quality regulation as mere implementations of
preexisting public rights.
This redefinition of property rights via the “discovery” of preexisting or somehow superior public rights is often justified by the asserted
importance of protecting the environment and public health. But such
justification flies in the face of the Fifth Amendment, which does not make
exceptions based on the perceived importance of the public purpose.
169. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396.
170. Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law
Development in California, 1850–1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource
Allocation in Nineteenth-Century America, LAW & SOC’Y REV. 10, Winter 1976, at
236, 36.
171. E.g., Montana Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38,
682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
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Indeed, where the public purpose is thought to be particularly important,
compensation for the taking of private property rights should be least
controversial. The primary inquiry is not based on the quality of the public
benefit: the primary inquiry revolves around the issue of whether a
property holder was divested of property without compensation.
Clearly, under common law, a property owner may not be
compensated for an act that is considered a nuisance. In such
circumstances there are private law remedies and the government has the
police power to regulate nuisances on private property. Uses causing
harms that must be compensated for under nuisance law and which the
state can therefore regulate are uses the property owner never had a right
to engage in. Their prohibition by regulation takes nothing. The same is
true for similar regulations of use of water rights if there was a common
law nuisance such as pollution or flooding––two unlawful invasions of
another owner’s property. In cases of nuisance, the property owner does
not warrant compensation.
As a result of the Fifth Amendment, some legal commentators
have tried to formulate a way around the compensation issue. Their basic
argument is that public policy to protect the environment will not advance
if the public must compensate property owners for what is to be taken from
them. Some commentators argue this shift in emphasis from private rights
in water to public rights in water will provide “opportunities for change”
to address environmental goals of increasing instream flows. 172
The argument against compensating water rights holders for rights
taken by the government is faulty in two ways: first, it would be
unconstitutional and second, the argument is based on flawed public policy
philosophy. The next section will address the flawed public policy
inherent within a water rights system that would decrease private rights in
water while increasing so-called public rights.
V.

PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST CREATING
PUBLIC INTERESTS IN WATER

Some legal commentators have argued that as a result of
increasing demand for water rights, both consumptive and non-

172. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of
Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 258 (1990).
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consumptive, the law needs to recognize public rights in water. 173 Lynda
Butler argues that the public interest needs to be recognized as a property
right.174 Joseph Sax argues that as times are changing and as we move
towards fundamentally different water strategy, the primary question is to
what extent claims of vested property rights will constrain opportunities
for change. 175 Fundamental to these arguments for public rights in water
is the belief that private rights will not lead to environmental health.
Therefore, the government must intervene and divine the public interest
that needs protection.
Even accepting that this is true, it does not alter the takings
analysis. The point of the Takings Clause is a recognition that sometimes
the pursuit of the public interest requires a taking of property rights, which
is allowed when compensation is paid. But the assumption that
environmental objectives will only be achieved by constraining property
rights, or that private property owners will not take measures to protect the
environment, is incorrect.
Private property owners have strong incentives to protect the
environment where doing so preserves or enhances the value of their
property. While it is certainly true that some uses of property have harmful
impacts on the environment, environmental stewardship is unlikely to be
the result of uncompensated takings. Rather the threat of uncompensated
taking creates incentives for property owners to extract other values before
a regulation is imposed. While it is possible for environmental interests to
acquire properties from those who would engage in environmentally
harmful activities, market failures often create obstacles to such
transactions. In such cases regulation is the appropriate remedy, but not
without compensation. If one can acquire through regulation without
compensation what might otherwise have been accomplished through
purchase, regulation will always be the preferred option. And it will come
at the expense of property owners rather than at the expense of the public
beneficiaries.
In addition to finding the most cost-effective approach to
environmental protection, we should be equally concerned to respecting
173. Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept
of Public Property, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 323 (1990). See generally, Sax, supra note 172;
Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water
Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990).
174. Butler, supra note 173, at 326.
175. Sax, supra note 172, at 258.
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the mandates of the U.S. Constitution––including the separation of
powers. In an eminent domain proceeding the determination of whether
the cost of property acquisition is offset by the benefits to the public rests
with the elected executive and legislative authorities. But when the
question is raised in an inverse condemnation or takings action in court,
the policy choice falls to often unelected judges. In the context of water
rights, as discussed supra, at least one court has called beneficial use “an
evolving concept” that “can be expanded to reflect changes in society’s
recognition of the value of new uses of our resources.” 176 But the courts
have no particular expertise in divining the public interest and, at least at
the federal level, they are not democratic institutions. A takings doctrine
requiring courts to balance individual interests against those of the public
is a prescription, indeed a mandate, for judicial policy making. The Penn
Central balancing approach effectively requires courts to make
substantive decisions of what is the public interest. Such policy making
by the courts should concern advocates of individual freedom as well as
advocates of democratic government. Under the American system of
government, the legislature (or the people acting directly) is, by definition,
the final arbiter of the public interest. Courts should adhere to their
constitutionally-prescribed duty to enforce the law that, among other
things, includes enforcing the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
The foregoing analysis of takings law as it applies to water rights
suggests an approach that will insulate the courts from straying beyond their
constitutional role into policy making. If all regulations of water use are
understood to be physical takings, the per se rule of Loretto applies and
there is no need for courts to engage in the balancing of private rights and
the public interest.
It is a common misconception that every citizen benefits from his
share of the public lands and the resources found thereon. Public ownership
of many natural resources lies at the root of resource control conflicts. With
public ownership resources are held in common; that is, they are owned by
everyone and, therefore, can be used by everyone. But public ownership
by no means guarantees public benefits. Individuals make decisions
regarding resource use, not large groups or societies. Yet, with government

176. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River
Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992).
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control, it is not the owners who make decisions, but politicians and
bureaucrats. The citizen as beneficiary is often a fiction. 177
Other economists have argued that some resources––such as air,
water, and sea resources––have eluded market processes because of the
difficulty to define and enforce property interests in those resources.
Without a property rights system that establishes clear, definable property
interests, the “tragedy of the commons” results, as commonly happens
when a natural resource is supposedly valued by the many, but owned by
none.178 These economists further argue that “the challenge in tackling
these tougher problems is to devise property rights regimes that can move
us out of the political arena and into the market where individuals face
opportunity costs of their actions.” 179 Leal has stated:
In fact, private individuals and organizations are probably
doing more to preserve the environment than the federal
government. For one thing, the majority of the prime
habitat for wildlife exists on fertile and low-lying areas
where most of the farms, ranches and private forests are,
not in the mountains and grasslands that the government
owns. For another, while the government can set aside
land as wilderness, national parks, and wildlife refuges,
government officials have less motivation to make sure
that the land they oversee is well cared for and that its use
does not harm others.180
Similarly, the authors of this article advocate providing private
citizens with the means to value the resources instead of relying on the
government’s guesstimates in response to political pressures. In order to
allow citizens the means to value the water resource, there needs to be a
refinement of the present western water law prior appropriations system
that fully establishes clearly definable interests in water rights. Critical to
177. RICHARD L. STROUP & JOHN A. BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES:
BUREAUCRATIC MYTHS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, 7–8 (1983).
178. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, supra note 8, at 161.
179. Anderson & Leal, supra note 178, at 161. See Richard L. Stroup,
Political Behavior, THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 45–50 (David R.
Henderson, Ph.D. Ed. 1993) (explaining why the political arena does not provide
satisfactory results in resolving natural resource issues or other issues of scarcity).
180. Donald R. Leal, Yes, Private Owners Protect the Environment,
(1993) (unpublished briefing paper, Property and Environment Research Center).
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this system is enforcement of the Fifth Amendment’s protection of
property rights.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In her dissenting opinion to the Kelo decision, Justice O’Connor
stated the Constitution establishes two conditions on the government’s
exercise of eminent domain: “the taking must be for a ‘public use’ and
‘just compensation’ must be paid to the owner.” 181 Additionally she wrote:
These two limitations serve to protect the “security of Property,” which
Alexander Hamilton described to the Philadelphia Convention as one of
the “great obj[ects] of Gov[ernment].” 182 Together they ensure stable
property ownership by providing safeguards against excessive,
unpredictable, or unfair use of the government’s eminent domain power—
particularly against those owners who, for whatever reasons, may be
unable to protect themselves in the political process against the majority’s
will.183 In the case of water rights, which deserve the same protection as
other real property rights in the West, but are also different in that they are
usufructuary rights, or only use rights, it is even more important that the
courts provide constitutional protections to water rights. If the government
can acquire through regulation without compensation what might
otherwise have been accomplished through paying just compensation,
government regulation will always be the preferred option. And it will
come at the expense of property owners rather than at the expense of public
beneficiaries. Such an outcome would be a violation of “security of
Property” as articulated by Alexander Hamilton, and as cited by Justice
O’Connor in Kelo.

181. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 231–32
(2003)).
182. Id. (citing 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 302 (M.
Farrand ed. 1934)).
183. Id.

